Contracts - Enforceability of a Promise of a Conditional Gift - Bredemann v. Vaughan Manufacturing Company, 40 Ill. App. 2d 232, 188 N.E. 2d 746 (1963) by DePaul College of Law,
DePaul Law Review 
Volume 13 
Issue 1 Fall-Winter 1963 Article 16 
Contracts - Enforceability of a Promise of a Conditional Gift - 
Bredemann v. Vaughan Manufacturing Company, 40 Ill. App. 2d 
232, 188 N.E. 2d 746 (1963) 
DePaul College of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review 
Recommended Citation 
DePaul College of Law, Contracts - Enforceability of a Promise of a Conditional Gift - Bredemann v. 
Vaughan Manufacturing Company, 40 Ill. App. 2d 232, 188 N.E. 2d 746 (1963), 13 DePaul L. Rev. 158 
(1963) 
Available at: https://via.library.depaul.edu/law-review/vol13/iss1/16 
This Case Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Via Sapientiae. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in DePaul Law Review by an authorized editor of Via Sapientiae. For more information, 
please contact digitalservices@depaul.edu. 
1) 5 DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
was equally a participant by his silence which constituted a tacit approval of
Moquin's action.
On previous occasion the Supreme Court of New Hampshire, in the
case of State v. La Rose,54 described the plea of nolo contendere and its
implications:
Under the plea of nolo, the defendant does not confess or acknowledge the
charge against him as upon a plea of guilty . . .but waiving his right to con-
test the truth of the charge against him, submits to punishment. The plea is in
the nature of a compromise between the state and the defendant-a matter not
of right, but of favor. Various reasons exist why a defendant conscious of in-
nocence may be willing to forego his right to make defense if he can do so
without acknowledging his guilt. Whether in a particular case he should be
permitted to do so, is for the court.
This holding in no way hinted that a defendant conscious of innocence
so. pleading is contemptuous of the court, much less his tacit approver.
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Moquin may have meant to
adopt the convenient fiction of an old Illinois case:
The court will punish all acts calculated to impede, embarrass, or obstruct
the court in the administration of justice. Such acts would be considered as
done in the presence of the court.55
In conclusion, the recognition of contempt power beyond the statutory
grants, as inherent because of necessity, rests on questionable grounds.58
It is submitted that the acts of the defendants, no matter how reprehensible
they might appear, were not contempt of court.
54 71 N.H. 435, 439, 52 Atl. 943, 945 (1902).
55 Stuart v. People, 3 Scam. (4 I1.) 395, 405 (1842).
56 A contrary argument could be made, if summary contempt powers were used dur-
ing Colonial and early Statehood days in New Hampshire, in light of the New Hamp-
shire Constitution (of 1784), Part II, Article 93, adopting, as the law of the land, "all the
laws which have heretofore been adopted, used, and approved. . . ."; but from realiza-
tion of the need for caution in interpreting the article, as urged by State v. Rollins, 8
N.H. 550 (1837), (applying the article to common law crimes), from not wanting to
reach the conclusion suggested by a critic of this work-but witchburning might thus
find Constitutional approbation, and from an unavailability of the necessary materials
for study, the matter was summarily dropped.
CONTRACTS-ENFORCEABILITY OF A
PROMISE OF A CONDITIONAL GIFT
Marie Bredemann was employed by Vaughan Mfg. Company from
1929 to 1954 as a biller and traffic manager. In 1943, Mr. Vaughan, then
president of the company, commended Mrs. Bredemann for her loyalty
and told her not to worry because "we intend to-I intend to see that you
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will be taken care of for the rest of your life."1 Mrs. Bredemann was
compensated at $375.00 per month when, in 1954, Mr. Grace, the suc-
ceeding president of the company, advised her that he had arranged a
retirement pension for her at her full salary and that "I want you to take
your retirement now, and we will-the company will pay you the full
salary for the rest of your life.' '2 In reliance on this promise, Marie Brede-
mann retired forthwith. Two and one-half years later (June, 1957) she
was informed that her pension would be cut in half as she had become
eligible to receive Social Security benefits. The company gradually re-
duced the amount of the pension payments until February, 1961, when the
payments were wholly terminated. Mrs. Bredemann then brought suit in
the Circuit Court of Cook County seeking damages for the breach of an
alleged oral contract and for a declaratory judgment holding the contract
to be valid and enforceable. Summary judgment was entered in favor of
the defendant employer. The Illinois Appellate Court reversed and re-
manded the matter on the ground that the plaintiff and defendant had
entered into an enforceable contract since Mrs. Bredemann's retirement
constituted sufficient consideration for Mr. Grace's promise. Bredemann
v. Vaughan Mfg. Company, 40 111. App. 2d 232, 188 N.E. 2d 746 (1963).
The Court unequivocally stated that it had found sufficient considera-
tion in the plaintiff's retirement to render Mr. Grace's promise binding,
since
when she accepted the promise made to her by Grace on behalf of the de-
fendant corporation and within two weeks retired from her position in the
company, [she] did an act which even without the invocation of the theory of
estoppel would constitute a sufficient consideration to support the contract.8
Had the plaintiff sacrificed a valuable right to remain in the employ of
the defendant as a bargained-for exchange for a promised pension, her
retirement would have constituted consideration and the promise would
have been enforceable in the best traditions of contract law. Here, how-
ever, the defendant could have discharged the plaintiff at any time. The
defendant's promise, therefore, would appear to be a promise of a gift-a
mere gratuity, and the plaintiff's retirement merely a condition requisite to
obtaining the gift, rather than a bargained-for consideration.
Consideration is essential to the transformation of a nudum pactum into
a contract.4 It is the act, forebearance or return promise which, when
1 Bredemann v. Vaughan Mfg. Co., Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 61 C 17251,
Record of Proceedings, p. 46.
21d. at 48.
3 Bredemann v. Vaughan Mfg. Co., 40 Ill. App. 2d 232, 245,. 188 N.E. 2d 746, 753
(1963).
4 2 BLTACKSTONE, COMIMENTARIES *445.
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bargained for as an exchange, invests a promise with legal enforceability. 5
The effects of consideration on the parties have been historically de-
scribed as a detriment incurred by the promisee and/or a benefit received
by the promisor at the request of the promisor.6
In cases where a promisor reasonably expected to induce the promisee
to take action of a definite and substantial character and such action had
in fact been taken in reliance on the promise, consideration has some-
times been excused to avoid injustice.7 The doctrine of promissory estop-
pel provides the theory for such enforcement of an otherwise nudum
pactum.8 The wisdom of this doctrine, which estops a promisor from
defending himself on the basis of lack of consideration, is the subject of
probing investigation. 9 The Illinois courts have touched on the doctrine in
dicta but have not yet based a decision on the doctrine of promissory
estoppel. 1 The Appellate Court decided the instant case solely on the
finding of consideration without the invocation of the doctrine of promis-
sory estoppel. Whether Mrs. Bredemann's reliance resulted in such in-
justice as would render Vaughan Mfg. Company's promise enforceable
under the doctrine, is, therefore, purely a matter for conjecture."
Would an employer bargain for the retirement of an employee, offering
him a life pension in exchange for that retirement, if the employer were
free to discharge him at will? Clearly not. To conclude, therefore, as the
court did, that Mrs. Bredemann's retirement was a quid pro quo for
Vauhan's promise, it was necessary to find that Mrs. Bredemann sur-
rendered a valuable right to remain in the company's employ. In 1943
Mr. Vaughan said, "[Y]ou will receive your salary until you can't work
5 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, S 75 (1932).
6 Thomas v. Thomas, 2 Q.B. 851, 114 Eng. Rep. 330 (1842); Petroleum Refractionat-
ing Corp. v. Kendrick Oil Co., 65 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1933); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS,
§99-103 (1936).
7 Ricketts v. Scothorn, 57 Neb. 51, 77 N.W. 365 (1898).
8 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS, § 90 (1932). For a discussion of promissory estoppel, see
4 DEPAUL L. REv. 320 (1955).
9 Compare, IA CORBIN, CONTRACTS, § 206 (1963) Witb 1 WILLIsTON, CONTRACTS,
SS 139-40 (1936).
10 Beatty v. Western College, 177 Il. 280, 52 N.E. 432 (1898); Dewein v. Estate of
Dewein,30 111. App. 2d 446, 174 N.E. 2d 875 (1961); Laughlin v. Irwin, 262 Il. App. 40
(1931); In re Estate of Switzer v. Gertenbach, 122 Ill. App. 26 (1905).
11 The decision in the instant case relied heavily upon the reasoning in Feinberg v.
Pfeiffer Co., 322 S.W. 2d 163 (Mo. App. 1959), which held for the plaintiff-employee
on a similar set of facts. The Missouri Appellate Court, however, held clearly on the
basis of promissory estoppel. Contra, Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ia.
1961); 47 IOWA L. REV. 725 (1962), which held that relinquishing jobs, rejecting posi-
tions, and moving families do not support the invocation of the theory of promissory
estoppel.
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anymore."' 2 The court reasoned that the 1943 statement "makes her em-
ployment an employment as long as she could work. Consequently when
she retired in reliance on Grace's promise she suffered a detriment."' 3 This
conclusion invests Vaughan's 1943 words with the attributes of a con-
tractual offer.
If Vaughan's promise constituted an offer for a unilateral contract to
be rendered enforceable by the plaintiff's continued employment, 14 the
promise would have had to be so definite in its terms and require such
definite performance in its acceptance that the obligations of both the
company and its employee would have been reasonably certain. 15 The
language here does not support such a conclusion; it fails to state either
a definite remuneration or a certain period of employment. 16
If the court concluded that Mr. Vaughan's 1943 statement was an offer
inviting a bilateral contract of permanent employment, the definite and
mutual exchange of promises required for such an employment contract
is not present.'7
Mutuality is the contractual requirement that both parties are bound or
neither is bound.'8 It is well settled under Illinois law that "permanent em-
ployment" is considered to be "at will."'19 The Illinois Appellate Court
has declared that
12 Bredemann v. Vaughan Mfg. Co., 40 111. App. 2d 232, 236, 188 N.E.2d 746, 749
(1963). Since Mr. Vaughan died in 1945 a question of admissibility of testimony was
raised under ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 51, § 4 (the "Dead Man's Act"). The court accepted
the testimony both because defendant had made no objection to it at the time of its
submission and because the defendant had included the testimony in its motion for
summary judgment. Cf. In Re Hershon, 329 Ill. App. 328, 68 N.E.2d 482 (1946).
'3 Bredemann v. Vaughan Mfg. Co., 40 Ill. App. 2d 232, 246, 188 N.E.2d 746, 753
(1963).
14 Scott v. Motor Lodge Properties, Inc., 35 Misc. 2d 869, 231 N.Y.S.2d 780 (1962).
See RESTATEMENT, CoNTRAcTs, § 12 (1932).
'5 Mitchell Novelty Co. v. United Mfg. Co., 94 F. Supp. 612 (N.D. Ill. 1950). See
RESTATEMENT, CoNTRACTs, S 32 (1932).
16 IA CORBIN, CONTRAcTs, § 153 (1963).
'7 Heuvelman v. Triplett Electrical Instrument Co., 23 111. App. 2d 231, 161 N.E.2d
875 (1959), requires that "such contracts extending for a long duration and resting en-
tirely on parol should have for their basis definite and certain mutual promises. The
words and the manner of their utterance should not be of that informal character
which expresses only long continuing good will and hopes for eternal association." Id.
at 236, 161 N.E.2d at 878.
18 People v. Davidson, 411 Ill. 267, 103 N.E.2d 600 (1952); Joliet Bottling Co. v. Brew-
ing Co., 254 Ill. 215, 98 N.E. 263 (1912); Higbie v. Rust, 112 111. App. 218, aff'd 211 Ill.
333, 71 N.E. 1010 (1904).
19 Davis v. Fidelity Fire Ins. Co., 208 II. 375, 70 N.E. 359 (1904); Meadows v. Radio
Industries, Inc., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955).
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in this state it is well settled that an employment upon a monthly or annual
salary .. . is presumed to be a hiring at will, which either party may at any
time determine at his pleasure without liability for breach of contract.20
It is, in fact, an accepted view that where an employee's salary is paid
monthly with no definite period or duration of employment the relation-
ship is a hiring at will.21 Therefore, when an employee who is free to
terminate his employment at will, seeks to sustain a claim against an em-
ployer who discharged him, his claim must fail for want of mutuality.22
Thus, even if there had been an offer of permanent employment by the
Vaughan Mfg. Company and an acceptance by Mrs. Bredemann, she would
have been unable to enforce a claim because the alleged contract lacked
mutuality of obligation.
Mrs. Bredemann, having no right to remain in the employ of the defend-
ant company, sacrificed nothing in retiring; there could be no considera-
tion for Grace's 1954 promise as Mrs. Bredemann sustained no detriment
as promisee and defendant, promisor, received no benefit from her retire-
ment. Mr. Grace promised Mrs. Bredemann a life pension on retirement
and failed to keep his word, but there was no contractual bar preventing
him from discharging her. The practices of business are often harsh, but
for every critic of these practices there is a champion who would de-
nounce paternalism in the commercial world.
It is basic that an offer is a promise conditional upon the exchange of a
return promise or performance. 23 But a promise need not anticipate the
reciprocal giving of consideration at all. In theory, any event may be
named in a promise as fixing the moment, on the happening of which a
promisor will perform a promise intended and understood to be gratui-
tous. Professor Williston suggests that an aid in determining whether a
promise is a conditional gift or a contractual offer is "an inquiry whether
the happening of the condition will be a benefit to the promisor. If so,
it is a fair inference that the happening was requested as a consideration. '24
Obviously, the happening of a condition may merely be a factor enabling
20 Fuchs v. Weibert, 233 IM. App. 536, 538 (1924).
21 Crawford v. Peabody Coal Co., 34 Ill. App. 2d 388, 181 N.E.2d 369 (1962); Bixby
v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ia. 1961); 47 IOWA L. Rav. 725 (1962); Watts
v. Greater Bethesda Missionary Baptist Church, 20 Ill. App. 2d 146, 154 N.E.2d 875
(1958); Cummings v. Chicago, A. & E. Ry., 348 Ill. App. 537, 109 N.E.2d 378 (1952);
White v. American Electric Fusion Corp., 328 IMI. App. 128 (1946); Skagerberg v.
Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936), 21 MINN. L. REv. 748 (1937).
22 Bixby v. Wilson & Co., 196 F. Supp. 889 (N.D. Ia. 1961); 47 IowA L. REV. 725
(1962); Hablas v. Armour & Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959); Meadows v. Radio Indus-
tries, Inc., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955).
23 Williston, An Offer Is a Promise, 23 ILL. L. REV. 100 (1928). See also RESTATEMENT,
CoNTRAcTs, § 24 (1932).
24 1 WILLISTON, CoNrACrs, S 112 (1936).
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the promisee to receive a gift. Certainly then the happening of such a
condition, even though brought about as a direct result of the promisee's
reliance on the promise, cannot be interpreted as consideration. 25
The courts have been careful to distinguish between sufficient consider-
ation and conditions performed in conformance to offers of gratuities. In
so distinguishing, the motives of the promisor and the circumstances under
which the promise was made must be cautiously investigated. The plain-
tiffs in Plowman v. Indian Refining Co.26 contended that the act of re-
porting to their former employer's office to pick up pension checks was
sufficient consideration for the payments. The court rejected this, reason-
ing that
the act was simply a condition imposed upon them in obtaining gratuitous
pensions and not a consideration .... Such acts were benefits to them and not
detriments. They were detriments to defendant [employer] and not benefits.
This is not consideration.2 7
Because of the problems inherent in differentiating a promise which pro-
poses a bargain and one which proposes a gift, courts have enforced both
a promise of remuneration to a nephew who refrained from smoking
28
and a promise to defray expenses of a European trip.
29
Perhaps the landmark case in the area of conditional gifts is Kirksey v.
Kirksey. 0 The defendant had written the widow of his brother, who was
living sixty miles away, "if you will come ... I will let you have a place to
raise your family."' 1 She moved her family and belongings and after two
years he required her to leave. It was held that an action would not lie as
the promise was a mere gratuity and the change of residence was simply
a condition to it.
Similarly, courts have not enforced a father's promised gift of land
which induced his son to change residence 2 or offers of permanent em-
25 Professor Williston gives the following example: "If a benevolent man says to a
'tramp'-'if you go around the corner to the clothing shop there, you may purchase an
overcoat on my credit,' no reasonable person would understand that the short walk was
requested as consideration for the promise ... [Oin a reasonable interpretation, it must
be held that the walk was not requested as the price of the promise, but merely a
condition of a gratuitous promise." Ibid.
26 20 F. Supp. 1 (E.D. Il. 1937), 23 CORNELL L. Q. 310 (1938) and 27 Ky. L. J. 345
(1939).
27 20 F. Supp. 1, 5 (ED. IM. 1937).
28 Hamer v. Sidway, 124 N.Y. 538,27 N.E. 256 (1891).
29 Devecmon v. Shaw & Devries, Ex'rs., 69 Md. 199, 14 Ad. 464 (1888).
808 Ala. 131 (1845). 81Id. at 132.
82 Forward v. Armstead, 12 Ala. 124 (1847); but see Burgess v. Burgess, 306 1. 19, 137
N.E. 403 (1922), where a father's promise to give land to son in exchange for its occu-
pation, improvement, and tax payment was enforced as the contract was established by
clear, definite, and unequivocal proof.
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ployment, which caused an engineer to reject a professorship 3 and a
baker to become a cub reporter.8 4 A plaintiff's changing her residence
and enrolling in a beauty culture school were also held to be conditional
acts rather than bargained-for consideration. 5
Analysis of the instant case discloses that Mr. Grace's promise was not
of a contractual nature, anticipating consideration, but was rather the
promise of a conditional gift. Mr. Grace made a promise of a pension to
Mrs. Bredemann, an employee he was free to discharge. He contemplated
no consideration but certainly a condition. It would, of course, be a con-
dition to a promise of pension that the promisee retire. Illinois formerly
adhered to a traditional interpretation of the law of contractual considera-
tion. The decision in Bredemann v. Vaugban Mfg. Company circum-
scribes a shadowy border of doubt around an area once defined with
clarity.
33 Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 266 N.W. 872 (1936), 21 MINN.
L. REv. 748 (1937).
3 4 Fisher v. Jackson, 142 Conn. 734, 118 A.2d 316 (1955).
35 Coder v. Smith, 156 Kan. 512, 134 P.2d 408 (1943).
EVIDENCE-ADMISSIBILITY OF THE FACT AND AMOUNT OF
A COMPROMISE SETTLEMENT WITH ONE JOINT TORT-
FEASOR IN THE TRIAL OF A SECOND JOINT TORT-
FEASOR
The plaintiff, John Burger, was a self employed contractor engaged in
building and repairing gutters. The defendant, The Rock Island Lumber
Co., a general contractor, contracted to replace roofing shingles and gut-
ters on a two story residence in Milan, Illinois. The defendant lumber
company then sublet the roofing work to the defendant, Henry Van
Severn, and the gutter work to the plaintiff. Van Severn commenced
work by building a scaffold from which to work on the roofing. The
plaintiff arranged to borrow this scaffold to work on the gutters of the
house (although there was some conflict in testimony regarding the exact
arrangements agreed upon). While he was working on the gutters, one
end of the scaffold gave way and the plaintiff fell sixteen feet, landing
upon a large railroad tie, causing him severe injuries. The plaintiff then
commenced suit against both the Rock Island Lumber Company and Van
Severn under the Illinois Structural Work Act,' alleging negligent con-
struction of the scaffold. Just prior to the trial, the plaintiff settled with
1 ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 48, § 60 (1961).
